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ABSTRACT
 
Geologic estimates ofremaining global petroleum resources place about 50% in the 
Persian Gulf. Production costs are estimated at $5 per barrel there, and $15 per barrel in the 
North Sea andAlaska. Using mathematical methods derivedfrom depletion theory, the present 
value ofeconomic rent from oil is on the order of$20 trillion. Game theory is utilized to explain 
the $15-$20 per barrel price band that eXistedfrom 1986 to 1999; new economicforces may 
displace this stable pattern. International trade in petroleum and conventional weapons are 
analyzed with econometric methods; the occurrence ofnuclear weapons capability is explored 
-

I. Introduction 
In 1980, shortly after Saddam Hussein assumed the Presidency of Iraq, that country 
attacked Iran in the southwest Khuzistan region. Iraq sought control over two major geographic 
goals: the Shatt-al-Arab channel, a shipping route for export of Iraqi oil; and the petroleum 
production facilities in Khuzistan, where more than 75% of Iran's oil resources were located. l 
In 1990, Iraq occupied Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia. If Iraq had been successful 
in these military actions, it would have controlled 40% of identified global reserves and 75% of 
Gulf reserves (see Table 1). 
In 1991, U.S. President George Bush supported a U.S.-led U.N. military coalition which 
defeated Iraq, emphasizing that, "Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of 
friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell 
into the hands of Saddam Hussein" (Yergin, 1991, p. 773). This military action eliminated Iraq's 
potential to raise crude oil prices and attain quasi-monopoly profits. Yet five years earlier, then 
Vice-President Bush had flown to the Persian Gulf, meeting with Saudi government ministers and 
the King. The purpose of this 1986 trip had been to raise crude oil prices, which at the time were 
below $10 per barrel. 
The purpose of our analysis is to illuminate part of the economic rationale for these 
superficially contradictory U.S. policies. We shall show the magnitude of the economic incentives 
for control of Persian Gulf oil, and also the logic which leads the U.S. and some other OEeD 
nations to work against crude oil prices below $15 per barrel, and above $20 per barrel. 
1 See Yergin (1991) and the International Petroleum Encyclopedia (1983).
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Table 1: Estimates of World Conventional Crude Oil Resources (billion barrels, 1993) 
Region/Country Identified Reserves Undiscovered 
Resourcesa 
Remaining 
Resources 
Persian Gult' 
Saudi Arabia 
Iraq 
Kuwait + Neutral Zone 
Iran 
UAE 
592.4 
258.6 
90.8 
99.4 
69.2 
61.1 
113.7 
50 
35 
4 
19 
4.2 
702.1 
308.6 
125.8 
103.4 
88.2 
65.3 
Former Soviet Union 125.1 100 225.1 
United States 51.1 40.6 91.7 
N. Sea • W. Europe 
United Kingdom 
Norway 
Netherlands 
37.3 
19.5 
17.1 
0.7 
12.3 
5.6 
6.7 
na 
48.9 
25.1 
23.8 
49 
Worldc 1094.5 427.7 1513.3 
8: modal value. 
b: includes Oman, Brunei, Qatar, and Bahrain, in addition to the 5 countries mentioned. 
c: includes other regions and countries. 
na: not available 
Source: Masters et al. (1994). Table 1. 
-
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The first section identifies the magnitude of economic rent (defined below) which partially 
motivates foreign policies of the Gulf countries and the U.S.. It uses game theory logic to explain 
the $15-$20 per barrel range in which crude oil prices usually move. The second part analyzes 
global military trade in the context of petroleum imports and exports. This is followed by a brief 
summary of the growth in nuclear weapons capability in the region. Then we summarize the pre­
1980 history of Gulf production and international relations. We conclude with a discussion of 
future implications. 
II. Petroleum Price, Rent, and Game Theory 
In the petroleum economics trade literature, $5 per barrel is widely used as the likely 
equilibrium price in a theoretically competitive world oil market working without production 
quota agreements (Adelman, 1986 and 1993; The Economist, 1999; Yergin, 1991). 
Table 2 illustrates the production cost in a low-cost area in the Persian Gulf, and also for 
the North Sea. "Production cost" here means exploration, development, lifting, and shipping 
costs to an GEeD consumer. It includes a normal return on investment ("profit"), and allowances 
for depletion and risk factors. However, for purposes of discussion, assume average Persian Gulf 
cost is $5 per barrel, and North Sea (and Alaskan) cost is $15 per barrel. 
In other words, if the market price is $15 per barrel, a Persian Gulf producer earns "rent" 
of $10 per barrel above the $5 per barrel production cost. With Gulf production typically 6 or 7 
billion barrels per year, total economic rent above production cost was on the order of $100 
billion annually in the late 1990s. 
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Table 2: D1ustrative Production Cost 
Possible Low Persian Gulf 
Cost 
Possible North Sea Cost 
Investment in Development, 
amortized (including profit) 
55¢ $10 
Operations, lifting 25¢ $5 
Shipping $1.50 included in operations 
Total (rounded) $2.50 $15 
Source: Chapman and Khanna (2000) and ChaP.ma_n..<.19.9.3..), _ 
-
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Mathematical techniques can be used in economic modeling to analyze the potential 
surplus or rent associated with use of the world's remaining oil resources. (Remaining resources 
are the sum of (a) identified reserves, and (b) geological estimates of undeveloped or unexplored 
petroleum resources). Equation (1) shows the basic objective of a hypothetical monopolistic 
world oil industry: 
Maximize with respect to q, and T 
(1) 
T 
subject to L qt ~ S. 
t= 1 
The logic is straightforward. NPV is the net present value of rent, the excess of revenue above 
cost. (Revenue is P*q, and cost is C). In the denominator, r represents the interest rate in 
calculating net present value. Remaining resources are S. The second line in the equation notes 
that future cumulative oil use cannot exceed remaining resources. 
The goal, then, is to maximize NPV for producers by finding T, the optimal length of time 
for remaining production, and the best annual production levels qt. (For a full explanation of this 
mathematical technique applied to world oil, see Chapman and KhallJla, 2000, and Chapman, 
19932.) Of course the same method can be applied to an assumption of a competitive market. 
The results are summarized in Table 3. In Table 3, the magnitude of the present value of 
producers' rent is generally $15 to $20 trillion. (The exception, Case 4, has a lower NPV of $5.5 
trillion). 
2 In these analyses, the problem is addressed with continuous rather than discrete functions. With 
conventional industry assumptions, the solutions show (a) a long period of accelerating use, followed by decline, 
and (b) prices stable or declining slightly, followed by continuous increases. 
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Table 3: Economic Rent and Oil Use 
Case T: optimal production 
period until depletion 
(years) 
NPV: net present value of 
economic rent above cost 
(trillions) 
1. Competitive market 69 $ 16.7 
2. Monopolistic market 92 $ 21.5 
3. Competitive market until 
2030, then monopolistic 
81 $ 16.2 
4. Competitive, but 
substitute biomass or coal 
liquid fuels available at 
$50 per barrel 
48 $ 5.5 
5. Monopoly with substitute 
fuels available at $50 per 
barrel 
55 $ 14.9 
Source: Chapman and Khanna (2000) 
-
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Gross World Economic Product is now on the order of $35 trillion. The magnitude of 
economic rent above cost for world oil producers is comparable but smaller. The incentive for 
Iraqi-type military actions is clear, as is the incentive for OECD and other nations to oppose 
monopolistic or single-nation influence in the Persian Gulf. 
Notwithstanding the magnitude of economic surplus potentially available to a monopoly, 
crude oil prices have usually been in the $15 to $20 per barrel range. A competitive market 
would have lower prices (e.g. $5), and a monopolistic market would have higher prices (e.g. $30). 
Yet, since the Bush trip to Saudi Arabia in 1986, world oil prices were in the $15 to $20 range for 
10 of the 13 years (MER, various issues). 
We believe that economic, political, and military factors have lead both OECD consumers 
and OPEC producers to prefer this $15-20 per barrel range, as summarized in Table 4. Consider 
U.S. net imports of petroleum, which have risen slowly and have passed the 50% level for total 
consumption. The U.S. production is costly; production cost in the Persian Gulf is not. 
Consequently, low crude oil prices increase U.S. dependence on imports in two ways. High cost 
U.S. production has to be shut down when crude prices are near or below $10 per barrel on a 
long term basis. Second, U.S. consumption of oil increases with lower prices. The end result is 
that crude prices in the $15 to $20 per barrel range avoid financial loss for American oil 
producers, slow the decline in U.S. production levels, and encourage U.S. political support for 
Persian Gulf governments threatened by Iraq or other forces seeking monopoly power over 
Persian Gulf oil.3 
-
3 This discussion of Table 4 is based upon the game theory analysis in Chapman and Khanna (2000). 
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Table 4: General Economic Impact of Crude Oil Price Decision 
in a Game Theory Framework 
Price per barrel OECD Countries Persian Gulf Oil Producers 
$10 or less • higher GNP growth 
• shut domestic production 
• greatly increased oil consumption 
• much more imports 
• more pollution, climate change 
• end Persian Gulf political support 
• loss of DECO political support 
• lower revenue, greater volume 
• higher market share 
• faster depletion 
$15 - $ 20 • stable GNP growth 
• stable near-term oil production 
• slow growth in oil consumption 
• slow growth in import share 
• stable prices 
• continued Persian Gulf support 
• continued DECO political 
support 
• stable revenue, profit, rent 
$30 • decline in GNP growth 
• rapid near-term growth in 
production 
• stable or declining consumption 
• end Persian Gulf support 
• loss of DECO political support 
• less market share 
• less production, more profit, rent 
• greater payoff to successful Iraq-
type action 
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Consider Japan's position in supporting the military defense of Kuwait by the U.S.-led 
operation. Japan imports essentially all of its petroleum Three-fourths of its crude oil has 
originated in the Persian Gulf region (USEIA, 1994, p. 52). In the short run, it would benefit 
from a $5 to $10 per barrel world price. But, if Persian Gulf oil drives out U.S. and North Sea 
producers, the resulting monopoly-influenced price would eventually exceed the current $15 to 
$20 per barrel range. With a long run perspective~ Japan can depend upon stable prices and 
political stability for its supply, both supported by the U.S. (Yergin, 1991, pp. 759-760). 
Table 4 lays out these and related points in a game theory framework. Both Persian Gulf 
and GECD governments have been accustomed to the $15 to $20 per barrel price range. Either 
group, acting alone, could for a short period force prices in either direction. However, at least for 
the near term, both groups have incentives to keep prices in this range. This is similar to the game 
theory concept ofNash Equilibrium: a status quo where neither side can improve its overall 
situation by changing its strategy. A game theory approach is intended to represent the previously 
noted interaction of politics, military defense, and economics in world oil markets. 
This $15 to $20 per barrel level is far below a true monopoly price. It is also far above a 
truly competitive world price. The outcome in one narrow facet resembles a competitive market: 
world price is about the level where its equals the marginal cost of high cost producers. 
In 1998, cash prices for Persian Gulf oil ranged from $10 to $15 per barrel. The primary 
cause may have been a cessation of accelerated growth in petroleum consumption in Asia. 
Throughout most of that year, futures prices remained within the $15-$20 per barrel range. With 
the downward pressure on 1998 cash prices, the 1999 response could be anticipated which would 
raise crude oil prices. 
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ID. Arms Trade and the Oil Economy 
The economic incentive underlying military activity in the Persian Gulf has been 
established in the previous section. Here we examine the global arms trade in the context of the 
oil economy and determine the empirical significance of a few key nations in this context. 
Based on a comprehensive global data set, Table 5 determines a fairly close empirical. 
relationship between world trade in conventional weapons and the trade in crude oil and refined 
petroleum products: arms exports (imports) are highly correlated with oil imports (exports). 
Exploring this relationship are a pair of regression models based on a cross section of 121 
countries for 1995.4 The regression coefficients have the expected sign given the results in Table' 
5. These coefficients should be interpreted carefully since the arms variables are measured in 
million dollars whereas the oil variables are in billion dollars. Thus, according to these regression 
results, a $1 billion increase in total oil imports yields a $0.16 billion increase in the exports of 
conventional weapons, on average. Similarly, a $1 billion increase in the total volume of oil 
exports results, on average, in a $0.11 billion increase in the value of arms imports. It is 
interesting that in both models variables measuring the size and overall economic health of the 
economy, namely GNP and GNP per capita, were found to be insignificant explanatory variables. 
4 The sources for these data are the same as those in Table 5. The figures in parenthesis are the 
heteroscedasticity consistent t-ratios based on White's heteroscedasticity consistent standard error estimates. See 
Greene (1997) for details. As expected, no evidence of autocorrelation was found. The regression slope 
coefficients are significant at the 5% level in both models. 
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Table 5: Correlation Coefficients 
Correlation of 
Arms exports with 
Arms imports with 
Total arms trade with 
Total arms trade with 
Total trade with 
Oil imports 
Oil exports 
Total trade 
Total oil trade 
Total oil trade 
Pearson's Correlation Coefficient 
0.74 
0.70 
0.69 
0.80 
0.81 
Variable definitions: All data are for 1995
 
Arms exports (imports): value of conventional weapons exports (imports)
 
Arms trade: sum of arms exports and arms imports 
Oil imports (exports): total volume of crude oil and refined petroleum products imports 
(exports) 
Total trade: total value of merchandise imports and exports 
Data sources: ACDA 1997 and 1998, WTO 1999, USEIA 1996. 
-
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Modell 
Arms Exports = -294.56 + 159.95 Total oil imports + error R2 =0.52 
(-1.11) (2.16) 
Model 2 
Arms Imports = -2.65 + 108.24 Total oil exports + error R2 = 0.51 
(-0.03) (2.32) 
To identify the key countries in this context, consider Table 6 which provides details on 
the value of arms transfers between the major supplier and recipient countries. It is clear from this 
table that more than 50% of the global exports of conventional arms between 1994 and 1996 
originated in the United States, followed by the United Kingdom at a distant second. Saudi 
Arabia was the single largest recipient of these weapons, receiving almost three as times as high a 
value of arms imports as the next highest recipient, Egypt. Other countries in the Persian Gulf 
region, particularly Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, are also significant importers of 
conventional weapons, each receiving approximately $800-$1000 million per year.s 
Drawing together the statistics on arms trade presented above, the crude oil reserves data 
in Table 1, and country specific details on the imports and exports of crude oil and refined 
petroleum products (USEIA 1998), we can identify the key countries in the international oil-
conventional weapons economy. It is clear that, in general, the worlds largest arms exporters are 
also the largest oil importers, whereas the countries with the largest remaining and identified 
crude oil resources are the largest recipients of these arms. 
-
5 For detailed country specific arms imports and exports data see various issues of the World Military 
Expenditure and Anns Trade reports published annually by the United States Anns Control and Disarmament 
Agency. 
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Table 6: Value of Arms Transfer Deliveries by Major Supplier and Recipient Country 
(Cumulative 1994-1996, millions of current dollars) 
Supplier Total US UK Russia France Gern~ China Other Middle Other Other Other All 
any NATO East East . West East Others 
Recipient Europe Europe Asia 
World 119,565 67,210 16,405 8,490 6,675 4,045 1,970 4,610 3,070 2,130 2,485 595 1,880 
Developed 52,070 38,760 1,355 845 2,160 3,025 40 1,990 1,310 180 1,370 200 835 
US 3,330 - 950 40 160 320 40 950 330 30 140 200 170 
Israel 2,865 2,600 0 0 0 150 0 5 0 10 0 0 80 
Russia 50 30 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 
France 695 550 0 0 - 0 0 40 5 0 0 0 80 
Gennany 2,710 2,600 0 0 0 - 0 60 10 0 0 0 0 
Japan 6,020 6,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Developing 67.495 28,450 15,050 7,645 4.515 1,020 1,930 2,620 1,760 1,950 1,115 395 1,045 
China 2,565 120 0 2,000 0 0 - 0 320 30 0 0 80 
Taiwan 4,090 3,300 0 0 775 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OPEC 36,080 15.150 12.915 1.625 3,040 190 525 940 85 310 860 150 290 
Iran 1,025 0 0 320 0 0 500 10 10 80 10 50 5 
Kuwait 3,405 1,900 675 750 60 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 26,585 11,700 11,200 0 2,000 60 0 775 0 0 850 0 0 
UAE 2,270 800 260 200 750 0 0 0 0 20 0 40 200 
NATO 25,525 18,150 1,195 230 1,300 1,470 40 1,785 580 45 275 200 255 
Source: ACDA, 1998. Table III. 
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IV. Instability, Local Conflict, and Nuclear Weapons 
The Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia are usually considered distinct regions. 
However, a broader network of national tensions overlays the Persian Gulf region. Five of the 
world's nuclear-capable countries have borders within 1600 miles ofthe Straits of Hormuz.6 In 
all cases, the missile range is long enough to make a nuclear aggression in the Persian Gulf region 
a technically feasible option (see Table 7). The other two nuclear capable regions, the United 
States and the European Community, are both major importers of Persian Gulf oil. 
Figure 2 shows countries with nuclear warheads and their oil production. The apparent 
association is spurious, in the sense that crude oil production does not cause nuclear capability. 
There are at least seven sets of national rivalries that have involved nuclear-capable countries.7 
The simplest interpretation of the Figure is that most of the conflicts associated with nuclear-
capable countries have the potential of affecting the Persian Gulf. 
Pakistan, though not a major oil producer, borders the Gulf of Oman and the Indian 
Ocean. A nuclear conflict involving India and Pakistan would probably impact Gulf shipping and 
perhaps production. 
Petroleum revenues received from the DECO by Gulf producers probably do not directly 
finance conflict in what, for lack of an established term, we call the "Straits of Hormuz global 
sector". But individuals and organizations in the Gulf countries finance military operations in 
6 From West to East: Israel, Russia, Pakistan, India, China. See map (Figure 1). 
­
7 Since World War II: Israel-Arab countries; Pakistan-India; India-China; Russia-U.S.; France and U.K.­
Russia; Russia-China; China-U.S. 
14 
other countries in this sector.8 
8 It has been asserted that sources in Saudi Arabia and Iran support Muslim military operations in 
Kashmir (National Geographic, 1999). 
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Table 7: Nuclear Weapons 
Name and history Arsenal Representative Missile Range 
(number of warheads) (miles) 
1. Countries with declared nuclear weapons capabilities 
United States 
First test: 1945 
Total number of tests: 1,030 
United Kingdom 
First test: 1952 
Total number of tests: 45 
France 
First test: 1961 
Total number of tests: 210 
Russia 
First test: between 1945-1952 
Total number of tests: 715 
China 
First test: 1964 
Total number of tests: 45 
India 
First test: 1974 
Total number of tests: 6 
12,070 8,100 
7,500380 
500 3,300 
22,500 6,800 
450 6,800 
1,50065 
2. Countries with undeclared nuclear weapons capabilities 
Israel 64-112 930 
Known to have bomb 
Pakistan 15-25 930 
Began secret program in 1972 
3. Countries that terminated nuclear weapons programs 
Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, South Africa. 
Source: Time Magazine, 1998. 
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Figure 1: The Persian Gulf and Surrounding Regions 
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Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCUMap_collection/middle_ea8t.html 
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Figure 2: Countries with Nuclear Warheads and Oil Production
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Data for this figure were obtained from USEIA (1999) and Time Magazine (1998). 
2.5 
v. A Historical Perspective on Persian Gulf Policy 
Throughout the 20th century, the Gulf has been of considerable interest to the U.S., 
European, and Russian governments. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company preceded the British 
Petroleum Company. Both companies worked to provide a secure supply of petroleum for the 
United Kingdom during the earlier decades of the century. As was typical, British companies 
simply assumed the responsibilities of government in their concessions in Iran's oil regions: 
customs, police, taxation, telegraph, education, and banking (Upton, 1961; Chapman, 1983). 
Russia, on the other hand, sought, rather unsuccessfully, to promote Soviet republics in Northern 
Iran. From 1953 to 1978, Iran's policies were coordinated with U.S. interests, as is well known 
(e.g., Yergin, 1991; Roosevelt, 1979). 
In Saudi Arabia, four U.S. oil companies established economic relations with the Saudi 
government. Originally formed in 1933 as the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, 
ARAMCO, (Arabian American Oil Company) managed Saudi oil after WWII (ARAMCO, 1960; 
Yergin, 1991). While the companies no longer exert such control, the relations between the Saudi 
and the U.S. government remain strong, as discussed above. 
Each Persian Gulf country has an analogous individual history that fits into the larger 
mosaic of oil production and historical relations with European and U.S. companies and 
governments. 
VI. Summary: Implications for Intemational Policy 
Historically, Europe, the United States, and Russia have sought to secure access to 
Persian Gulf oil. Its low cost and high volume of remaining resources continue to place the Gulf 
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at the center of petroleum geopolitics. The magnitude of economic rent above cost is on the 
order of $15-20 trillion. 
Military power has played a significant role in policy. Iraq, in its invasions of Iran and 
Kuwait and its threat to Saudi Arabia, has sought control over one-half of the world's remaining 
resources. The U.N. alliance, led by the United States, eliminated Iraq's military power, and 
continues to control Iraq's military capabilities as well as its oil sales. 
In the late 1990s, weapons trade became closely associated with petroleum trade, as 
analyzed above. As nuclear weapons capabilities slowly spread, an unexpected byproduct of 
national rivalries has been the creation of a geographic pattern in which five of the nuclear powers. 
are within 1600 miles of the Straits of Hormuz. The other nuclear powers are major consumers 
of Persian Gulf oil. Iraq would probably have nuclear warheads today if not for the U.N./U.S. 
control over its military resources. 
Thus far, international policy in the Gulf is the result of diplomacy, military action, and 
economic relations, setting the $15-20 per barrel price range outlined above. 
As production from Alaska and the North Sea continue to decline while world 
consumption grows, the stable picture of growing production in the context of mild price 
fluctuations may change. Mexico and Norway have initiated effective coordination with Saudi 
Arabia and OPEC (New York Times, 1999). If this effort is successful beyond the immediate short 
run, future crude oil prices may be move out of their recent $15-20 per barrel range. The impact 
of higher prices above this range will, as noted above, change the relations between the OECD 
consumers and the Gulf producers. In addition, the magnitude of the economic rent would 
increase above the values analyzed here. 
20 
We do not suppose that we can suggest or advocate practical new policies to stabilize 
politics, prices, and production. We hope this analysis lays out some of the motivation for more 
explicit international policies in this context. 
21
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